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This paper examines the impact of Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage
insurance activity on homeownership at two levels: census tract and metropolitan area.
The 1990 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act dataset combined with the 1980 and 1990 U.S.
Censuses is used in the analysis. This study extends the previous studies of FHA activity
by having broader coverage, a better measure of relative FHA activity and better control
of other factors that affect homeownership and mortgage activity. The empirical results
indicate that the FHA mortgage insurance program has significant positive effects on
homeownership in predominantly white and/or moderate to high-income MSAs and pre-
dominantly minority and/or moderate- to high-income census tracts. However, the esti-
mated coefficients associated with the relative FHA activity are found to be relatively
small in magnitude. Overall, results suggest that FHA programs are of limited effect in
the achievement of homeownership, but may be of greater assistance to whites relative
to blacks. q 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
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The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was established after the Great
Depression to improve housing standards and conditions, to provide an adequate
home financing system through insurance of mortgages, and to stabilize the
mortgage market. Its current mission includes contributing to the building and
preservation of healthy neighborhoods and communities, maintaining and ex-
panding homeownership opportunities, and stabilizing credit markets in times of
economic disruption.2 In order to achieve these objectives, the FHA insures
lenders that extend credit to the borrowers who do not have sufficient down-
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payments required by conventional lenders in order to purchase a house.3 Ac-
cording to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report (1998), its single-
family program has insured more than 24 million home mortgages since its
inception. The U.S. homeownership rate has increased from 40 to 68% during
the life of the FHA. There has, however, been recent discussion about the future
of FHA mortgage insurance programs. As can be seen from Fig. 1, although the
FHA had a 68.9% share in the mortgage insurance market in 1970, its market
share has been declining during the last decade. In the 1990s, FHA-insured loans
constituted 9.2% of the total dollar volume of mortgages originated and 34.5%
of the total volume of the insured loans. Furthermore, the development of a
secondary mortgage market and the revitalization of private mortgage insurance
industry jeopardize the continuity of the FHA’s mortgage insurance programs.4
In the evaluation of the FHA’s mortgage insurance programs, one of the key
questions raised is whether FHA programs have been successful in terms of
increasing homeownership. In spite of the importance of this question, there is
no empirical research examining the impact of FHA mortgage insurance programs
on homeownership at the census tract and MSA levels. This paper attempts to
fill that gap. It examines the relationship between FHA-insured mortgage activity
and the homeownership rate in neighborhoods approximated using census tracts
and metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), controlling for all other factors that
might affect homeownership. The goal is to provide some insights into whether
these programs have achieved their purpose and whether current programs should
be maintained or revised.
The analysis of the impact of FHA activity on homeownership is a difficult
problem for several reasons. First, in order to examine the association between
FHA activity and homeownership, there is a need to control for all other factors
that might affect homeownership, such as wealth, default risk, age and size of
household, housing price, income level, and the existing housing stock. Second,
3If the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is above 80% borrowers are required to get mortgage insurance.
With mortgage insurance, lenders are protected in case of the default of a borrower. Even though
private mortgage insurance (PMI) companies provide similar insurance, the FHA has more lenient
requirements than PMI companies have. For example, PMI companies usually do not insure mortgages
if the downpayment is less than 5% of house value (the LTV ratio was raised to 97% in 1994). In
addition, they require that the monthly payment for mortgage principal, interest, taxes, and insurance
must be less than 28% of the mortgagor’s monthly gross income (front-end ratio). Moreover, if a
household does not have a good credit history or has a high amount of consumer debt, they may
not be allowed to apply for or may be rejected for conventional loans. Although the FHA has less
rigorous downpayment requirements, it restricts the loan amount that an individual can borrow. The
maximum loan amount was $124,875 in high-cost areas in 1990. For a more detailed list of the FHA
and PMI requirements, see Goodman and Nichols (1997) and the U.S. GAO report (1996).
4Vandell (1995) lists the causes of FHA’s recent decline in the mortgage market, including focusing
more on high-risk and low-equity loans, competition from private mortgage insurers, other government













FIG. 1. Market share of FHA insured loans in dollar volume of mortgage originations, 1–4 family units. Source: Author’s calculations based on HUD
U.S. Housing Market Conditions.
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it is difficult to measure FHA activity. Gross FHA activity may not be appropriate
because census tracts and MSAs differ in terms of mortgage activities, housing,
and economic and demographic characteristics. The best measure may be FHA-
insured mortgage lending activity relative to total home mortgage lending. How-
ever, although aggregate FHA data have been available at census tract and MSA
levels for a long time, the other mortgage originations, such as conventional
loans and mortgages originated by mortgage bankers, were not available until
the 1990s. Third, there is debate concerning the appropriate unit of observation.
Neighborhood or census tract level analysis is important since lenders make their
choices based on neighborhood characteristics. Those critical of the FHA argue
that FHA mortgage insurance programs have resulted in abandoned and deteriorat-
ing neighborhoods because of fraud and misconduct in FHA mortgage origina-
tions. However, the analysis at the neighborhood level does not provide the
appropriate overall picture because individuals might change their neighborhoods
in becoming homeowners. Since tenure choice and mobility decisions are made
simultaneously (Zorn, 1988), households do not necessarily stay in the same
neighborhood when they become homeowners. Hence, MSA level analysis may
be more appropriate since the mobility of individuals among neighborhoods in
the MSA can be taken into consideration. In addition, FHA loan limits are set
generally at the MSA level. Ideally, both MSA and neighborhood levels should be
examined. However, detailed neighborhood data were not available until recently.
This paper examines the relationship between FHA lending and homeown-
ership by attempting to solve some of the problems mentioned in the previous
paragraph. First, a broader coverage is obtained by combining 1980 and 1990
U.S. Census datasets. This permits variables such as changes in neighborhood
characteristics to be used. Second, FHA activity is measured relative to all
mortgage activity, providing a proper control for other mortgage activity. The
availability of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) dataset at the census
tract level enables us to obtain not only FHA lending but also other mortgage
originations by mortgage bankers and depository institutions. Third, analyses are
performed at both census tract and MSA levels. Census tracts are taken as
approximations for neighborhoods. The analysis at census tract level assumes
that households stay in the same census tract when they become homeowners.
On the other hand, the analysis at the MSA level assumes that households can
move other census tracts when they get a mortgage.
It is hypothesized that areas with higher FHA activity as a percent of total
mortgage originations tend to have higher homeownership rates, controlling for
all other characteristics of census tracts and MSAs. According to the U.S. GAO
report (1996) that examines the 1994 HMDA dataset, the FHA market share for
home purchase loans made to the first-time homeowners is 21%. These loans
correspond to 67% of FHA-insured home purchase loans. Furthermore, about
two-thirds of FHA’s 1995 home purchase borrowers would not qualify for private
mortgage insurance on the loans they received. Similarly, Bunce et al. (1995),
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using American Housing Survey data for 1983 through 1992, calculate that on
average 57% of FHA-insured loans are obtained by the first-time homebuyers
with the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio greater than 95%. In 1996, 74% of the FHA
loans are originated for the first-time homebuyers (GAO, 1998). These figures
suggest that FHA has an important role in providing mortgage for the first-time
homebuyers and those households that do not qualify for the requirements of the
private mortgage insurance companies. It can be argued that although FHA-
insured loans are generally more expensive than conventional loans, first-time
homebuyers and those with low downpayments prefer them.5 Hence, FHA activity
may increase the homeownership rate. In order to see whether the impact of
FHA activity on the homeownership rate differs for whites and blacks, the
models are estimated for them separately. In addition, census tracts and MSAs
are compared based on their minority population and relative income level.
The empirical results indicate that the FHA mortgage insurance program has
significant positive effects on homeownership in predominantly white and/or
moderate to high-income MSAs and predominantly minority and/or moderate-
to high-income census tracts. However, the estimated coefficients associated with
the relative FHA activity are found to be relatively small in magnitude. Overall,
the results suggest that FHA programs are of limited effect in the achievement
of homeownership, but may be of greater assistance to whites relative to blacks.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the results of
several studies examining FHA activity. The third and fourth sections present,
respectively, the empirical model and data used in the analysis. Results for
census tract and MSA level estimations are presented in the fifth section. Policy
implications of the findings are discussed in the sixth section. The seventh section
concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND
The results of several studies have suggested that FHA-insured mortgage
programs might benefit individuals and households that could not become home-
owners with conventional loans due to high downpayments and low mortgage
payment-to-income ratio constraints. For example, Linneman and Wachter (1989)
find that downpayment or loan-to-value (LTV) ratio requirements restrict some
individuals from becoming homeowners. These constraints are found to reduce
the probability of homeownership of young adults by 10 to 20% (Haurin et al.,
5The FHA used to be the last resort for becoming homeowner. However, the availability of subprime
mortgage loans and risk-based pricing of mortgage credit has changed this status of the FHA-insured
loans. Subprime loans are those made by lenders who target borrowers that are judged to be higher
risk. In some cases, subprime lending can involve not only higher interest rates but also some
“predatory” practices.
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1997). In addition, Zorn’s results (1993) suggest that approximately 46% of
U.S. households, both first-time homebuyers and renters, are constrained by
downpayment and mortgage payment-to-income ratio requirements. Similarly,
Philips and VanderHoff (1994) show that the elimination of the LTV constraint
increases housing demand by 6.2% and the elimination of the mortgage payment-
to-income constraint increases housing demand by another 6%. These findings
imply that FHA programs might increase homeownership by providing mortgages
to those households that are on the margin of eligibility for conventional loans.
However, Goodman and Nichols (1997) show that households that are eligible
for FHA loans become eligible for conventional loans within few years. Hence,
households might wait to become homeowners if they are not qualified for the
conventional loans, reducing the impact of FHA on homeownership.
Several studies have found that blacks are more likely to use FHA-insured
mortgages (Canner et al., 1991; Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1991; Önder, 1998), and
that they are more likely to be exposed to FHA loans than whites (Yinger, 1991).
In addition, blacks have different homeownership behavior from their white
counterparts (Wachter and Megbolugbe, 1992; Buist et al., 1994), and their
homeownership rate is lower than that of whites. Megbolugbe and Linneman
(1993) group the reasons for low homeownership rate of minorities into three
categories. First, some factors that determine tenure, such as income and wealth,
are highly correlated with minority status. Second, minorities may face discrimi-
nation in purchasing a house. Third, they may have a distinct type of housing
demand function. When the demand function of minorities is combined with
market supply idiosyncrasies, they might prefer renting to owning. The first two
reasons suggest that FHA-insured loans might help blacks more in becoming
home owners than whites because a large downpayment is not required for
FHA-insured loans and because blacks are more likely to be exposed to FHA-
insured loans.
The literature on homeownership is very rich.6 In general, the aggregate home-
ownership rate is taken as an aggregation of individual tenure choice decisions.
Hence, the factors that affect an individual’s tenure choice will also affect the
aggregate homeownership rate. The level and the variation of homeownership
rates are empirically explained by financial, demographic and institutional factors
(Buist et al., 1994). For example, the wealth and income of households and
the cost of owning relative to renting are important in explaining not only
homeownership rates but also racial and ethnic variation in homeownership rates
6There are several factors that might affect homeownership rate. For example, age, income, race,
family structure, house values, property taxes, availability of housing units for renting and owning
and geographical region are some of the factors that will affect an individual’s homeownership
decision. For the review of tenure choice literature and the summary of factors affecting homeown-
ership rate, see Megbolugbe and Linneman (1993).
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(Wachter and Megbolugbe, 1992). Moreover, there is geographic variation in
homeownership rates.7 The homeownership rate is low in young, minority-popu-
lated, and low-income areas. In addition, the availability of mortgage alternatives
might affect the homeownership rate. For example, if there is monopoly in the
lending market, mortgage interest rates will be higher (Aspinwall, 1970), re-
stricting the ability to become a homeowner. This suggests that the availability
of FHA loans in these areas might increase homeownership.
There are variations among census tracts and MSAs in terms of minority
population and income level, both of which might affect homeownership and
mortgage activity. The supporters of FHA mortgage programs argue that those
living in low-income and minority neighborhoods would be less likely to become
homeowners without FHA mortgage insurance programs because these neighbor-
hoods are considered to be underserved by conventional mortgage lenders. Empir-
ically, it has been found that minority households (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1991),
borrowers with high default risk (Canner et al., 1991), and those living in central
cities, or in neighborhoods with a high unemployment rate, high minority popula-
tion, or low median family income (MacRae et al., 1982; Megbolugbe et al.,
1994; Önder, 1998) are more likely to use FHA loans. However, there is a
shortage of studies examining whether the FHA achieves its purpose in terms
of increasing homeownership rate at the macro level and whether there is a
difference in the impact of FHA activity on homeownership in the underserved
areas. The next section presents the empirical model used in the analysis to
answer these questions.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
In the analysis of the impact of FHA activity on homeownership, all other
factors that might affect homeownership have to be taken into consideration.
Given the results of previous studies, these factors are grouped into four categories
in the model: demographic, economic, housing, and lender market characteristics
in the area.8
Analysis at Census Tract Level
The basic model used for the census tract level estimations can be expressed as
7For example, Haurin et al. (1988) find that aggregate homeownership rates vary from 49 to 72%
in the 34 large metropolitan areas covered by the 1974–1975 and 1977–1978 Annual Housing Surveys.
8Although individual factors are also important in homeownership decision, the unavailability of
detailed individual level data restricted the analysis with only census tract characteristics.
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OWNn 5 b0 1 o
M
m51
dmMSAmn 1 b1FHAn 1 b2INCOMEn
1 b3DEMOGRAPHICn 1 b4HOUSINGn (1)
1 b5LENDER MARKETn 1 «n,
where OWNn is the ratio of owner-occupied households to total number of
households in the census tract n.9 MSAmn represents a vector of dummy variables
(fixed effects) taking a value of 1 if the census tract n is located in the MSA m
and taking a value of 0 otherwise. These dummy variables are included in the
model in order to control for the impact of MSA characteristics on homeownership
in census tracts. Hence, this model can be considered as an intra-MSA model,
comparing the census tracts located in the same MSA. FHAn shows the percentage
of FHA-insured loans among the newly originated home purchase loans in the
census tract n. INCOMEn represents a vector of economic variables including
median family income in the census tract, the change in median family income
in the census tract over the last decade and dummy variables showing the income
level of the census tract n relative to the income in the corresponding MSA.
Median family income splines are also included in the model in order to identify
any nonlinear relationship between income and homeownership. DEMO-
GRAPHICn represents a vector of demographic variables including minority
percentage, average household size, age distribution of head of household, popula-
tion, change in overall population, and change in minority population over the
last decade in the census tract n. Housing market characteristics are represented
by HOUSINGn . It includes the distribution of housing units according to the
1990 U.S. Census. LENDER MARKETn represents a vector of variables charac-
terizing the lender market in the census tract n. The Herfindhal index, as a
measure of concentration in mortgage market, and the ratio of mortgage bankers-
to-depository institutions are included as lender market characteristics.
In the model specified in Eq. (1), the effect of FHA-insured mortgage activity
on the homeownership rate is assumed to be similar regardless of minority share
or relative income level in the census tract. Previous studies find that FHA
activity is higher in high minority-populated and low-income neighborhoods, but
homeownership rates are lower in these neighborhoods (for example, MacRae
et al., 1982; Megbolugbe et al., 1994). In order to examine the impact of FHA
activity on homeownership in these areas, two different models are also estimated.
The first model tests whether the impact of FHA activity on homeownership
differs depending on the minority population in the census tract. Census tracts
9The homeownership rate was also defined as the ratio of owner-occupied housing units to total
available housing units. However, the results did not change with respect to the definition of homeown-
ership rate.
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are grouped into four categories depending on their minority10 share: predomi-
nantly white (less than 10% minority share), moderately white (between 10 and
25%), moderately minority (between 25 and 50%), and predominantly minority
(more than 50%). The second model tests whether the impact of FHA activity
on the homeownership rate differs in census tracts depending on their relative
income level. Census tracts are grouped into five categories according to their
median family income relative to the median family income in the corresponding
MSA: distressed (less than 50% of MSA median family income), low income
(between 50 and 80%), low-to-moderate income (between 80 and 100%), high-
to-moderate income (between 100 and 120%), and high-income (more than
120%).11 Two sets of dummy variables are created for each minority share and
relative income group and included in the model. The interaction variables be-
tween FHA-insured mortgage activity and the dummy variables representing
minority share or relative income level are also incorporated. Since FHA programs
aim at increasing homeownership in underserved areas, such as predominantly
minority-populated and low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, it is hypothe-
sized that the impact of FHA activity on the homeownership rate is positive and
significant in these census tracts.
Analysis at MSA Level
The estimation at the MSA level employs a two-step procedure, as used in
Avery, Beeson and Sniderman (1999).12 This procedure eliminates the impact of
neighborhood characteristics on homeownership rate at MSA level analysis.13 In
the first step, the homeownership rate in the census tract is regressed against
other census tract characteristics that might affect homeownership in census tract.
The MSA dummy variables (fixed effects) are also included in the model.
10Minority population is defined as nonwhite population. It includes blacks, Hispanics, Native
Americans, Asians, and others.
11Neighborhoods are classified similarly in the Report to the Congress. Neighborhoods classified
based on their income relative to the MSA median income are called distressed (less than 50%),
low-income (between 50 and 80%), moderate-income (between 80 and 120%), and high-income
(more than 120%) neighborhoods. In the same report, neighborhoods are classified based on their
minority share as predominantly white (less than 10% minority share), moderately minority (between
10 and 50%), and predominantly minority (more than 50%) neighborhoods (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 1993).
12For more information about the two-step procedure, see Avery et al. (1994; 1999).
13Although MSA level analysis can be done using aggregated homeownership rate and aggregated
FHA activity, this procedure will mask the impact of census tract characteristics at the MSA level.
MSAs with heterogeneous census tracts are different from the MSAs with homogeneous census
tracts, even though these MSAs have similar characteristics at the aggregate level. Hence, the
distribution of census tracts is also important and the neighborhood factors should be controlled in
MSA level analysis in addition to the MSA characteristics.
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In the first step, the following model is estimated:
OWNn 5 b0 1 o
M
m51
bmMSAmn 1 b2INCOMEn 1 b3DEMOGRAPHICn (2)
1 b4HOUSINGn 1 b5LENDERn 1 «n.
This model is similar to the first model estimated at the census tract level,
specified in Eq. (1). However, FHA activity at the census tract level is not
included in the first step estimation since the aim is to examine the impact of
FHA on homeownership at the MSA level.14
In the second step, the impact of FHA activity at the MSA level is examined
controlling for MSA characteristics in addition to census tract characteristics.
The following model is estimated in the second step,
OWNm 5 g0 1 g1FHAm 1 g2INCOMEm 1 g3DEMOGRAPHICm (3)
1 g4LENDERm 1 «m,
where
OWNm 5 oNmn51 (OWNn 2 (b̂0 1 b̂2INCOMEn (4)
1 b̂3DEMOGRAPHICn 1 b̂4HOUSINGn 1 b̂5LENDERn)) 5 b̂m.
The dependent variable in this step is the estimated coefficient on the dummy
variable for each MSA at the census tract level, b̂m . This coefficient represents
the homeownership rate in the MSA that is not explained by census tract character-
istics. This procedure picks up any census tract effect incorporated in FHA
activity as well as its impact on homeownership. FHA activity at this level,
FHAm , is obtained by aggregating FHA activity from census tracts located in
the same MSA. In other words, it is the share of FHA-insured loans among all
home-purchase loans originated in the MSA m during the period analyzed.
Nm is the number of census tracts in the MSA m. Control variables at the MSA
level are similar to those used at the census tract level. INCOMEm includes
dummy variables representing the median family income level in the MSA relative
to the national median family income, median family income in 1990, growth
in median family income between 1980 and 1990, share of households with
income less than $50,000 and unemployment rate. DEMOGRAPHICm represents
a vector of variables including growth in population between 1980 and 1990,
14When census tract level FHA activity is included in the model in addition to other census tract
characteristics, the results show that FHA activity does not affect homeownership significantly at
the MSA level.
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change in minority share over the same decade, dummy variables for minority
share, percentage of young population, average household size, and dummy
variables for population. LENDERm represents lender market characteristics—the
Herfindahl index for mortgage market concentration and the mortgage bank-to-
deposit institutions ratio. In addition, dummy variables representing the regions
in the country are included in the model.
Similar to the census tract classifications, MSAs are grouped into four catego-
ries based on their minority share: predominantly white, moderately white, moder-
ately minority, and predominantly minority. Similarly, they are grouped into four
categories based on their median family income relative to the national median
family income:15 low-income (less than 80%), low-to-moderate income (between
80 and 100%), high-to-moderate income (between 100 and 120%), and high-
income (more than 120% of national median family income). Including interaction
variables between these dummy variables and FHA activity in the MSA, the
impact of FHA-insured mortgage activity on homeownership rate is analyzed in
MSAs based on their minority share or relative income level.
DATA
Same datasets are used in the analysis at both census tract and MSA levels.
Two datasets are combined in the analysis: 1980 and 1990 U.S. Censuses and
the 1990 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) dataset.16 FHA and LENDER-
MARKET variables are calculated from the latter dataset. Since the HMDA dataset
provides mortgage originations at the individual level,17 mortgage activity is
aggregated from individual mortgage originations in the corresponding area. All
other variables are obtained from the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Censuses.
Census Tract Level Data
The total number of census tracts analyzed is 39,124. Census tracts located in
Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico are not included in the analysis. Table I presents
15According to the 1990 U.S. Census, the national median family income is $35,700 based on the
author’s calculation.
16According to the HMDA, depository institutions, their direct subsidiaries whose assets exceed
$10 million and which have a branch office in an MSA, savings and loan associations, service
corporations that grant home loans, mortgage banking subsidiaries of commercial banks, and mortgage
lending institutions with assets exceeding $10 million that are unaffiliated with depository institutions,
have to provide information about mortgage applicants’ characteristics, such as type of loan, mortgage
applicant’s income, race, sex, location of loan, and final decision of lender on the extension of credit
(Canner and Gabriel, 1992).
17Even though HMDA dataset is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset on mortgage
originations, it does not provide some information that is important in tenure and mortgage decisions,
such as default risk, wealth and cost of owning. Because of the omission of these variables, the


























Mean Homeownership Rates and FHA Activity in the Census Tracts Based on Certain Census Tract Characteristics
Number of Change in White Black
census Homeownership homeownership homeownership homeownership FHA
Census tracts tracts rate rate, 1980–1990 rate rate activitya
All census tracts 39,124 0.62134 20.02797 0.67580 0.41570 0.26519
Census tracts with FHA-insured mortgage activity
0.00–0.10 15,375 0.60242 20.00962 0.67201 0.32352 0.01956
0.10–0.25 6,772 0.66857 20.02439 0.70680 0.42926 0.14175
0.25–0.50 8,162 0.63877 20.03631 0.68063 0.44956 0.33327
0.50–1.00 8,815 0.59476 20.05313 0.64535 0.46134 0.67509
Census tracts with minority share
0.00–0.10 16,078 0.74203 20.02214 0.74870 0.48513 0.21004
0.10–0.25 8,537 0.60644 20.03264 0.62762 0.41184 0.27412
0.25–0.50 5,582 0.51346 20.03621 0.55598 0.37588 0.30972
0.50–1.00 8,927 0.44411 20.02834 0.53726 0.42139 0.31673
Census tracts with median family income relative to MSA income
0.00–0.50 3,019 0.24614 20.02727 0.28724 0.26681 0.31854
0.50–0.80 7,566 0.43679 20.03586 0.49764 0.39241 0.34418
0.80–1.00 8,855 0.60415 20.03121 0.64013 0.47065 0.29292
1.00–1.20 8,779 0.68534 20.02577 0.70925 0.51020 0.25208
1.20– 10,705 0.73063 20.02349 0.74620 0.55262 0.19206
Source. Author’s calculations based on 1980, 1990 U.S. Census and 1990 HMDA datasets.














Mean Homeownership Rates and FHA Activity in the MSAs Based on Certain MSA Characteristics
Change in White Black FHA-insured
Number of Homeownership homeownership homeownership homeownership mortgage
MSAs MSAs rate rate, 1980–1990 rate rate activitya
All MSAs 335 0.62134 20.01416 0.67580 0.41570 0.26454
MSAs with FHA activity
0.00–0.10 50 0.54988 0.00186 0.63087 0.31550 0.03708
0.10–0.25 106 0.64854 20.00919 0.69245 0.42640 0.17167
0.25–0.50 120 0.64190 20.01836 0.69135 0.44399 0.35968
0.50–1.00 59 0.62719 20.04064 0.66472 0.45452 0.59420
MSAs with minority share
0.00–0.10 110 0.67923 20.01698 0.69538 0.38063 0.26504
0.10–0.25 132 0.66157 20.02027 0.69923 0.44687 0.27942
0.25–0.50 81 0.60212 20.01132 0.66565 0.42816 0.30578
0.50–1.00 12 0.45111 0.00409 0.52608 0.30278 0.09874
MSAs with median income related to national income
0.00–0.80 91 0.64775 20.03459 0.69536 0.48462 0.41845
0.80–1.00 142 0.64204 20.02635 0.68310 0.43358 0.32933
1.00–1.20 65 0.58629 20.00155 0.65655 0.38505 0.20335
1.20– 37 0.62844 0.00364 0.68427 0.37929 0.12013
Source. Author’s calculations based on 1980, 1990 U.S. Census and 1990 HMDA datasets.
a FHA-insured mortgage activity is defined as the ratio of total FHA-insured mortgage originations to total mortgage originations in the MSA.
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mean homeownership rates in 1990, changes in homeownership rates from 1980
to 1990, and FHA activity at the census tract level weighted by the number of
households in each census tract. The mean values suggest that FHA activity has
been concentrated in areas with low homeownership rates. For example, mean
overall and white homeownership rates are highest in census tracts with moderate
FHA-insured mortgage activity (between 10 and 25% of total mortgage origina-
tions), but they are lowest in census tracts with more than 50% FHA activity.
However, the mean black homeownership rate is highest in the latter tracts. The
average decline in overall homeownership rate during the last decade is highest
in census tracts with high FHA activity. The mean FHA activity is lowest in
almost all white and high-income census tracts where the mean overall, white,
and black homeownership rates are highest. These mean values suggest that in
general FHA has high market share in census tracts where homeownership rate
is low because high FHA activity is observed in census tracts with low homeown-
ership rates. However, these figures are only mean values without controlling
for the other census tract characteristics and the MSA where the tract is located.
The descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression analysis at the census
tract level are reported in the Appendix (Table A1).
MSA Level Data
The number of MSAs in the sample is 335. Those MSAs in Alaska, Hawaii,
and Puerto Rico are excluded from the analysis. The census tract observations
are aggregated at the MSA level. Table II presents mean homeownership rates,
change in homeownership rates from 1980 to 1990, and FHA activity in MSAs
classified based on their FHA-insured mortgage activity, minority percentage,
and relative median family income, weighted by the number of households
in each MSA. Although no clear-cut relationship between overall and white
homeownership rates and FHA-insured mortgage activity is observed, the black
homeownership rate is highest in MSAs with the highest relative FHA-insured
mortgage activity. White and black homeownership rates and FHA activity are
highest in moderately white-populated MSAs. Interestingly, not only the mean
FHA activity but also all of the mean homeownership rates are highest in low-
income MSAs (MSAs where the median family income is less than 80% of the
national median family income). The descriptive statistics for the variables used
in the regression analysis at the MSA level are shown in the Appendix (Table A2).
Several assumptions are imbedded in this analysis. First, it is assumed that
the results obtained in the period analyzed are representative of the past; hence,
it can be generalized for past years. Second, FHA activity is approximated by
the presence of FHA lending, resulting in the indirect test of FHA activity. Third,
all other factors that might affect homeownership are assumed to be controlled
for in the analysis. However, some factors that influence tenure and mortgage
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choices, such as wealth and cost of owning, are not available. Fourth, homeown-
ership that is obtained at one point in time is assumed to represent marginal
homeownership activity.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Results at Census Tract Level
The estimated marginal impacts of FHA activity18 on homeownership rate at the
census tract level are presented for all households, as well as for white and black
households in Table III.19 The results show that FHA activity and homeownership
are positively and significantly related, controlling for economic, demographic,
housing, and lender market characteristics of census tracts located in the same MSA,
although the coefficient on FHA activity is small. If the average FHA activity
increases by 100%, the average homeownership rate will increase by only 2.2%.
This finding is consistent with the study by LaFayette et al. (1995). In their simulation
analysis, the homeownership rate of individuals declined by only 0.1% in the
absence of FHA loans.
When census tracts within the same MSA are compared based on their minority
share,20 it is found that the coefficient on FHA activity is increasing with minority
share, controlling for other demographic, economic, lender market and housing
characteristics of census tracts. For example, if average FHA activity increases by
100%, average homeownership rate will increase by 0.8% (4.0%) in predominantly
white (predominantly minority) neighborhoods. These results suggest that FHA-
insured mortgage activity is most helpful to those households living in moderately
and predominantly minority census tracts, supporting the findings of previous studies
that FHA programs serve minority neighborhoods (e.g., MacRae et al., 1982).
18All models presented in the paper are also estimated using government-insured mortgage activity,
i.e., including FHA, Veterans Administration (VA), and Farmers Housing Administration (FmHA)
loans, assuming that the VA and FmHA loans are close substitutes for FHA loans. The results of
these estimates are similar but the coefficients are found to be slightly lower than the figures that
are obtained by using only FHA-insured and conventional loans. This suggests that other government-
insured mortgages might not be used by first-time homebuyers. For the sake of brevity, they are not
reported in the paper but available from the author upon request.
19The estimated coefficients on control variables are similar to expectations. For example, predomi-
nantly white-populated, or relatively wealthy census tracts or census tracts with a decline in minority
population over the past decade have higher homeownership rates than other census tracts. Parameter
estimates and their t-statistics are presented in the Appendix (Table A3). The coefficients for white
and black households are found to be similar to those for all households. One exception is that unlike
white and all homeownership rates, black homeownership rate is found to be lowest in predominantly
white neighborhoods. In order to save space, the results for white and black homeownership models
are not presented. They are available from the author upon request.
20The model is estimated with interaction variables between FHA activity and dummy variables


























Marginal Effects of FHA-Insured Mortgage Activity on Homeownership Rates at Census Tract Levela
Overall Whites Blacks
Parameter t- Parameter t- Parameter t-
estimate Statistic estimate Statistic estimate Statistic
All census tracts 2.16 10.43 1.21 5.30 0.47 1.62
Census tracts with minority share
0.00–0.10 0.84 2.66 0.06 0.21 23.98 23.50
0.10–0.25 0.88 2.80 0.47 1.49 21.07 21.62
0.25–0.50 1.73 5.15 2.65 7.31 21.07 21.89
0.50–1.00 4.00 13.93 3.63 7.43 1.65 4.76
Census tracts with median family income
Less than 50% of MSA income 0.15 0.31 20.78 20.85 20.63 20.86
Between 50 and 80% of MSA income 2.25 7.55 0.46 1.29 20.04 20.07
Between 80 and 100% of MSA income 2.62 8.69 1.64 5.12 0.88 0.21
Between 100 and 120% of MSA income 2.54 7.91 1.63 4.88 2.41 4.55
More than 120% of MSA income 2.38 6.51 1.45 3.84 1.83 2.88
a All of the marginal effects are multiplied by 100. These parameter estimates can be interpreted as the impact of the change in average FHA activity on
the average homeownership rate. The parameter estimates on the first row represent the estimated coefficient on the FHA mortgage share for all, white, and
black households at the census tract level. The second part of the table summarizes the impact of FHA activity in different census tracts classified according
to their minority share. The coefficients represent the impact of FHA activity in the corresponding census tract. They are estimated assuming that the impact
of FHA-insured mortgage activity is different in census tracts with a different minority share. They are calculated from the estimated coefficients on interaction
variables between FHA activity and dummy variables representing the census tract adjusted from the base census tract group, which includes census tracts
with a minority share of less than 10%. Similarly, the third part of the table presents the impact of FHA activity on homeownership in census tracts with
different relative income levels. The model assumes that the impact varies according to the income level in census tract relative to the income level in the
corresponding MSA. The marginal effects are calculated from the estimated coefficients on interaction variables between FHA activity and dummy variables
representing the census tract adjusted from the base census tract group, which includes census tracts with relative income less than 50% of the MSA median
family income. The estimated models for all households are presented in the Appendix, Table A3.
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The impact of FHA activity is found to be different for white and black households
in census tracts with different minority population shares. For white households,
the positive association between homeownership and FHA activity is significant in
moderately and predominantly minority census tracts (with more than 25% minority
share). However, for black households, the significant and positive relationship is
obtained only in predominantly minority census tracts (with more than 50% minority
share). Interestingly, in predominantly white census tracts, the coefficient on black
FHA activity is found to be significant and negative. It is possible that black
households living in white census tracts might get FHA loans and move to more
minority-populated census tracts in order to own houses. Since the change in
population is also controlled for, a negative coefficient is observed.
The analysis of the impact of FHA activity with respect to the relative median
family income level suggests that the FHA does not have a significant impact in
the distressed neighborhoods where median census tract income is less than 50%
of median family income in that MSA. However, FHA-insured mortgage activity
has a significant and positive relationship with homeownership in low-, moderate-,
and high-income census tracts located in the same MSA.21 These results are interest-
ing since the mean relative FHA activity is highest in distressed and low-income
census tracts, and the aim of the FHA programs is to increase homeownership rate
in these neighborhoods. The insignificant coefficient in distressed neighborhoods
and significant coefficients in other neighborhoods may be explained by the mobility
of households from low-income census tracts to moderate- and high-income census
tracts to become homeowners. For example, renters having higher income relative
to their neighborhood are particularly more likely to move to better neighborhoods
when they become homeowners. It is also possible that households living in high-
income neighborhoods but having high default risk may be using FHA loans to
become homeowners. In addition, first-time homeowners in these wealthy neighbor-
hoods who could get conventional loans might be using FHA loans in order to get
a higher rate of return by putting less equity in their houses.
Similar results are obtained when white and black households living in census
tracts with different income levels are compared.22 The results suggest that white
households living in moderate- and high-income neighborhoods and black house-
holds living in high-to-moderate and high-income census tracts benefit most from
FHA loans in becoming homeowners. These results are contrary to the basic aim
of FHA programs, i.e., increasing homeownership rate in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods.
21The census tracts are classified into groups relative to the national median family income in
addition to MSA median family income. The results are similar to those reported on Table III and
Table A3.
22The equality of FHA coefficients for white and black households is rejected for all three models
at both census tract and MSA levels using F-test.
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TABLE IV
Marginal Effects of FHA-Insured Mortgage Activity on Homeownership Rates at the MSA Levela
Overall Whites Blacks
Parameter t- Parameter t- Parameter t-
estimate Statistic estimate Statistic estimate Statistic
All MSAs 3.43 2.53 5.88 4.22 5.37 3.48
MSA groups with minority share
0.00–0.10 9.27 4.10 9.14 4.50 4.51 0.97
0.10–0.25 1.22 0.65 3.94 2.10 20.42 20.21
0.25–0.50 20.75 20.38 2.30 1.07 6.04 3.23
0.50–1.00 0.18 0.05 23.00 20.64 13.43 3.41
MSA groups with income level relative to MSA median income (based on national median family
income)
Less than 80% 1.14 0.45 3.37 1.30 0.63 0.24
Between 80 and 100% 3.00 1.58 4.54 2.50 1.07 0.48
Between 100 and 120% 5.09 2.32 8.13 3.81 5.73 2.58
More than 120% 7.65 2.20 13.35 3.49 19.41 6.51
a All of the marginal effects are multiplied by 100. These parameter estimates can be interpreted
as the impact of the average FHA activity on the average homeownership rate. The first row shows
the estimated coefficients and corresponding t-statistics on the FHA mortgage share for all, white
and black households at the MSA level. The second part of the table summarizes the impact of FHA
activity in MSAs in different minority share groups. The coefficients represent the impact of the
FHA activity in the corresponding MSA. These coefficients are estimated assuming that FHA-insured
mortgage activity has different impact in MSAs with different minority share. They are calculated
from the estimated coefficients on interaction variables between FHA activity and dummy variable
representing the MSA adjusted from the base MSA group, which includes MSAs with a minority
share of less than 10%. Similarly, the third part of the table presents the impact of FHA activity on
homeownership in MSAs with different relative income levels. This model assumes that the impact
differs with the relative income level in the MSA. The impacts are calculated from the estimated
coefficients on interaction variables between FHA activity and dummy variables representing the
MSA adjusted from the base MSA group, which includes MSAs with relative income less than 50%
of the MSA median family income. The estimated models for all households are presented in Table A4.
Since most lenders make their mortgage decisions based on neighborhood charac-
teristics, the analysis of the impact of FHA activity on homeownership at the
neighborhood (census tract) level is important. Although the change in population
is controlled for, the estimated models at census tract level assume that people stay
in the same neighborhood when they become homeowners. Therefore, the results
may not provide the appropriate overall impact of FHA programs. Mobility associ-
ated with home purchase may result in small coefficients on FHA activity at the
census tract level. The next section presents the MSA level analysis that will shed
light on this issue.
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Results at MSA Level
The marginal effects of FHA activity at the MSA level are presented in Table
IV.23 It is found that for all households, FHA activity and homeownership are
positively and significantly related, controlling for economic, demographic, and
mortgage lender market characteristics of the MSA and its census tracts.24 The
coefficients are slightly higher at MSA level than those at census tract level.
These results are found to be true not only for all households but also for white
and black households.
When MSAs are compared based on their minority share, it is found that FHA
activity has a significant impact on homeownership rate only in predominantly
white MSAs. Specifically, FHA programs benefit households in predominantly
white MSAs more than those in other MSAs with similar census tract characteris-
tics.25 However, except for these MSAs, the impact of FHA activity is found to be
insignificant. Thus any impact of FHA is best explained at the neighborhood level.
The impact of FHA activity is found to be different for black and white
households. It is found that white FHA activity is significantly and positively
related to the white homeownership rate in predominantly and moderately white
MSAs where minority share is less than 25%. However, black FHA activity is
significantly and positively related to black ownership in relatively minority-
populated MSAs where the minority share is higher than 25%. These findings
suggest that whites living in white-populated MSAs and blacks living in minority-
populated MSAs get FHA-insured loans in becoming homeowners.
When MSAs are compared with respect to their relative income levels, it is
observed that FHA activity has the highest impact in high-income MSAs, control-
ling for census tract and MSA characteristics. This relationship is observed not
only for all households but also for white and black households. Similar to the
23The second stage estimations for all households are presented in the Appendix, Table A4. The
coefficients on control variables are found to be similar to expectations and the models are good in
terms of their explanatory powers. For the sake of brevity, all of the first step estimations and the
second step estimations for whites and blacks are not presented. They are available from the author
upon request.
24The MSA level homeownership rate is regressed against FHA activity and other MSA variables
without controlling for census tract characteristics. The results are slightly different from those
obtained when census tract characteristics are taken into consideration. However, they are more
difficult to interpret since they also reflect information at the census tract level. In addition, nonlinearity
between FHA activity and homeownership and the impacts of some census tract characteristics are
integrated into the MSA factors. No significant impact of the FHA is found at the overall level.
Significant and positive coefficients are observed in moderately and predominantly minority-populated
and moderate-income level MSAs (between 100 and 120%). The results obtained for white and black
households are almost the same. Their FHA activity has a positive and significant impact at the
overall level, as well as in moderate-income and predominantly minority-populated MSAs.
25The positive and significant impact of FHA activity on homeownership in almost all white-
populated MSAs is not explained totally by the neighborhood level FHA activity since the results
obtained by controlling census tract FHA activity are similar to those reported in Table IV.
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census tract level analysis, this finding seems to be contrary to the basic aim of
the FHA, i.e., increasing homeownership rate in low- and moderate-income areas.
These results should be interpreted with caution since individual factors, such
as wealth, default risk, and cost of owning, are not taken into consideration in
this study. Although we observe a significant impact of FHA in high-income
MSAs, households with low income, high default risk, or low wealth living in
these MSAs might be using FHA loans to become homeowners. We know that
in general, wealthy households are less likely to use FHA loans and more likely
to be homeowners. Since FHA activity and wealth are negatively correlated but
wealth and homeownership have positive correlation, the omission of wealth
may result in the underestimation of the coefficient on FHA activity. Hence,
this omitted variable (wealth) might explain the small effect of the FHA on
homeownership in these models.
In addition, the cost of owning is another important variable that affects the
tenure decision of households. If this cost is high in the area, individuals are less
likely to use FHA loans because of FHA loan limit. Furthermore, the homeown-
ership rate is expected to be low in places where the cost of homeownership is
high. Since this cost is negatively related with both FHA activity and homeown-
ership, the exclusion of this important variable might increase the impact of FHA
on homeownership. Hence, these two omitted variables may act in opposite and
offsetting directions. However, the omitted variables may reduce the standard
error of the estimated coefficient, leading to greater apparent significance of the
impact of FHA in some neighborhoods or MSAs.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study has some important policy implications. One of the aims of the
FHA is expanding homeownership in the areas underserved by conventional
lenders, such as minority-populated, distressed, and low-income neighborhoods.
Supporters of FHA programs argue that those living in low-income and minority
neighborhoods are less likely to become homeowners without FHA loans. The
results of the GAO and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) studies indicate that FHA serves first-time homebuyers and low-income
and minority households (GAO, 1996; Bunce et al., 1995). However, the results
of this study suggest that FHA does not affect the homeownership rate signifi-
cantly in these underserved neighborhoods. Although mean FHA activity is very
high, target households may not be using FHA loans in these areas. Hence, the
government entities should concentrate on the users of FHA loans in these
neighborhoods in evaluating the efficacy of federal mortgage programs.
The FHA has strict housing quality restrictions. Hence, the houses in distressed
neighborhoods where low-income households may be able to afford to buy a
house may not meet the quality standards of the FHA. Therefore, these households
may not get FHA loans. If FHA wants to increase homeownership in distressed
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neighborhoods, it may need to re-evaluate its standards in these areas. Even
though this suggestion appears to contradict the FHA objective of improving
housing standards and conditions, the FHA may in fact increase the quality of
housing in these neighborhoods by revising its quality standards and hence
increasing homeownership. The homeownership rate is very low in these neigh-
borhoods (24.6%). Since increased homeownership may increase housing quality
in distressed neighborhoods, the FHA might in fact increase housing quality in
these areas.
In evaluating the efficacy of FHA programs, neighborhoods should be taken
as a unit of comparison because the aggregation in MSAs masks the specific
characteristics of neighborhoods. Moreover, some of the census tract characteris-
tics offset the impact of FHA activity at the MSA level.
CONCLUSION
This study investigates the impact of FHA-insured mortgage activity on home-
ownership using 1990 HMDA dataset combined with the data from 1980 and
1990 U.S. Censuses. The findings suggest that FHA-insured mortgage programs
modestly helped households to become homeowners in 1990 at the aggregate
level. White households benefited more from FHA-insured loans in becoming
homeowners than black households did. Although a positive and significant
impact of FHA activity on homeownership is observed in the analysis, the
coefficients on the relative FHA activity are found to be relatively small.
The results suggest that contrary to expectations and the aim of the FHA, its
programs do not significantly contribute to homeownership rates in distressed
and low-income census tracts and MSAs. The high impact of FHA in relatively
wealthy areas can be attributed to the use of FHA loans by households with high
default risk or less wealth, and living in these areas. Similarly, the higher impact
of FHA on whites than blacks can be also explained by the use of FHA loans
by whites who have a higher default risk and less wealth than blacks. In addition,
although white first-time homeowners may be using FHA-insured loans, the
blacks using FHA-insured loans may not be first-time homeowners. The negative
effect of FHA on homeownership in distressed neighborhoods might be explained
by the mobility of households out of these neighborhoods when they become
homeowners.
The results presented here should be interpreted with caution for several rea-
sons. First of all, in the estimations, the individual characteristics of households
are not controlled for because of the unavailability of data. For example, the
positive and significant impact of the FHA in high-income census tracts could
be explained by the usage of FHA loans by high default risk or very low-income
households in these neighborhoods. Second, the homeownership rate is taken at
one specific point in time, but the mortgage activity is a marginal activity during
1990. Third, the analysis with U.S. Census data does not permit the examination
FHA MORTGAGE INSURANCE ACTIVITY 173
of homeownership and mortgage activity of low- and moderate-income house-
holds who have been targeted by the FHA. Fourth, it can be argued that small
mortgage bankers’ mortgage activity is underrepresented in the analysis because
they were not required to report their mortgage activity according to HMDA in
1990. However, the comparison of 1990 and 1992 HMDA datasets suggest that
this underrepresentation may be in the conventional market, not in the FHA
market. This comparison reveals that the market shares of mortgage bankers
were 31.5 and 46.4% in conventional loans and 74.3 and 73.8% in FHA loans
in 1990 and 1992, respectively. Fifth, even though the 1990 HMDA dataset is
used to match with 1990 U.S. Census data, this year may not be a representative
year for FHA activity because the U.S. was in recession over half of the year.
It is known that the share of FHA in mortgage originations increases when the
economy is in a recessionary period. In 1990, the FHA mortgage market share
was 13.2% whereas the average share of the FHA was 9.2% during the 1990s.
It may have extended credit more to current owners then first-time homeowners,
resulting in low impact of FHA activity on homeownership. Hence, the use of
the 1990 HMDA dataset might explain why no significant impact of the FHA
was observed in low-income areas.
In the future, an analysis could consider not only marginal borrowers but
marginal owners as well. Additionally, since the FHA aims to serve the low-
and moderate-income households, the analysis could examine the effect of FHA-
insured mortgage activity on the homeownership rate of these households when
the data become available. Finally, it will be more informative to include individ-
ual characteristics and easier to explain why FHA activity has a positive and
significant impact on high-income neighborhoods and MSAs when individual
level data become available. Unfortunately, there is currently no data set for the




Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Census Tract Level Analysis
(N 5 39,124)
Variables Mean Standard deviation
Homeownership rate 0.60693 0.23620
FHA-insured mortgage activity 0.30903 0.20353
Demographic characteristics of census tracts:







Variables Mean Standard deviation





Change in population, 1980–1990 0.11619 0.74189
Distribution based on population, 1990
Less than 1,000 0.03144 0.17450
Between 1,000 and 10,000 0.90599 0.29184
Between 10,000 and 50,000 0.06216 0.24145
More than 50,000 0.00041 0.02022
Average household size 2.65251 0.46214
Age of household head, 1990
Share of household heads aged 25–34 0.14378 0.06280
Share of household heads aged 35–44 0.21918 0.06468
Share of household heads aged 45–54 0.18065 0.04992
Share of household heads aged 55–64 0.17348 0.04488
Share of household heads aged 65–74 0.16054 0.05954
Share of household heads aged 75 or more 0.10808 0.06514
Economic characteristics of census tracts:
Distribution based on median family income
Less than 50% of MSA Median Income 0.07716 0.26686
Between 50 and 80% 0.19850 0.39887
Between 80 and 100% 0.22633 0.41846
Between 100 and 120% 0.22439 0.41718
More than 120% 0.27361 0.44582
Median family income, 1990 $37,852 $17,561
Distribution based on change in median family
income, 1980–1990
Less than or equal to 0% 0.04504 0.20739
Between 0.00 and 0.25% 0.14664 0.35375
Between 0.25 and 0.50% 0.55559 0.49691
Between 0.50 and 1.00% 0.23852 0.42619
Housing characteristics of census tracts:
Distribution of housing units, 1990
Share of structures, 1 unit attached 0.06381 0.11422
Share of structures, 2 units 0.06861 0.09640
Share of structures, 3–4 units 0.06093 0.07805
Share of structures, 5 or more units 0.19213 0.21996
Share of structures, mobile units 0.05114 0.09019
Lender market characteristics of census tracts:
Herfindhal index 0.19703 0.18012
Ratio of mortgage bankers to depository institutions 0.42911 0.20349
Central cities 0.52224 0.49951
Source. Author’s calculations based on 1980, 1990 U.S. Census and 1990 HMDA datasets.
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TABLE A2
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Estimation of the MSA Level
Analysis (Number of MSAs 5 335)
Overall White Black
Standard Standard Standard
Variable Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
FHA origination rate 0.30903 0.20353 0.29330 0.19969 0.48503 0.27152
Homeownership rate 0.65114 0.06482 0.68396 0.06170 0.40287 0.09881
Demographic characteristics of MSAs:
Minority percentage in 1990 0.19418 0.15161 0.19418 0.15161 0.19418 0.15161
Percentage change in 0.02668 0.02752 0.02668 0.02752 0.02668 0.02752
minority population
1980–1990
Average household size 2.62167 0.18270 2.62167 0.18270 2.62167 0.18270
Growth in population 0.11258 0.14560 0.11258 0.14560 0.11258 0.14560
Percentage of young 0.38427 0.05518 0.34903 0.23997 0.37587 0.07081
households (18–34)
Distribution of MSAs based on population
Less than 150,000 0.28358 0.45141 0.28358 0.45141 0.28358 0.45141
150,000–500,000 0.42229 0.49465 0.42229 0.49465 0.42229 0.49465
More than 500,000 0.26393 0.44141 0.26393 0.44141 0.26393 0.44141
Distribution based on minority population, 1990
Between 0.10 and 0.25 0.38710 0.48780 0.38710 0.48780 0.38710 0.48780
Between 0.25 and 0.50 0.23754 0.42620 0.23754 0.42620 0.23754 0.42620
More than 0.50 0.03519 0.18453 0.03519 0.18453 0.03519 0.18453
Economic characteristics of MSAs:
Median family income $33,499 $7,682 $31,618 $6,580 $19,779 $6,120
Percentage change in median 0.71022 0.22018 0.71022 0.22018 0.71022 0.22018
family income,
1980–1990
Households with income less 0.77273 0.08560 0.75504 0.09131 0.87963 0.07145
than $50,000
Unemployment rate in 1990 5.59099 2.01719 5.59099 2.01719 5.59099 2.01719
Distribution based on relative income, 1990
80% less than national 0.28446 0.45182 0.28446 0.45182 0.28446 0.45182
income
Between 80 and 100 % 0.41642 0.49369 0.41642 0.49369 0.41642 0.49369
Between 100 and 120% 0.19062 0.39336 0.19062 0.39336 0.19062 0.39336
More than 120% 0.10850 0.31147 0.10850 0.31147 0.10850 0.31147
Lender market characteristics of MSAs
Herfindahl index, 1990 0.01533 0.30965 0.01533 0.30965 0.01533 0.30965




Northeast 0.20597 0.40501 0.20597 0.40501 0.20597 0.40501
Midwest 0.25373 0.43579 0.25373 0.43579 0.25373 0.43579
South 0.18806 0.39134 0.18806 0.39134 0.18806 0.39134
West 0.35223 0.47838 0.35223 0.47838 0.35223 0.47838
Source. Author’s calculations based on 1980, 1990 U.S. Census and 1990 HMDA datasets.
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TABLE A3
Census Tract Level Estimation for All Households
Model: OWNn 5 b0 1 oMm51 dm MSAmn 1 b1FHAn 1 b2 INCOMEn 1 b3
DEMOGRAPHICn 1 b4 HOUSINGn 1 b5 LENDER MARKETn 1 «n.
Model I Model II Model III
overall minority share relative income
Para- Para- Para-
meter t- meter t- meter t-
estimate Statistic estimate Statistic estimate Statistic
Intercept 1.03 4.97 1.04 5.04 1.03 5.00
FHA Activity 2.16 9.24 0.84 2.66 2.38 6.35
FHA activity interacted with relative income groups
Income less than 50% 22.23 24.16
Income between 50 and 80% 20.13 20.80
Income between 80 and 100% 0.23 0.29
Income between 100 and 0.16 0.26
120%
FHA activity interacted with minority share groups
Minority population less 0.04 20.43
than 10%
Minority population between 0.89 0.94
10 and 25%
Minority population more 3.16 7.96
than 50%
Dummy variables for minority population
Minority population between 21.90 217.69 21.90 212.90 21.91 217.78
10 and 25%
Minority population between 22.62 217.91 22.92 214.72 22.62 217.86
25 and 50%
Minority population more 21.89 210.56 22.98 213.71 21.90 210.54
than 50%
Dummy variables for change in minority population 1980–1990
Base group: negative or no change
Change between 0.00 and 20.91 28.02 20.89 27.79 20.93 28.19
0.05%
Change between 0.05 and 21.22 28.64 21.16 28.21 21.23 28.80
0.10%
Change between 0.10 and 21.14 26.85 21.08 26.35 21.16 27.00
0.25%
Change more than 0.25% 21.15 26.66 21.11 26.37 21.17 26.78
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TABLE A3—Continued
Model I Model II Model III
overall minority share relative income
Para- Para- Para-
meter t- meter t- meter t-
estimate Statistic estimate Statistic estimate Statistic
Dummy variables for relative income groups
Base group: more than 120%
Less than 50% 22.23 25.48 22.10 25.13 21.54 23.36
Between 50 and 80% 22.74 210.87 22.74 210.88 22.64 29.00
Between 80 and 100 % 21.04 26.22 21.05 26.35 21.08 25.21
Between 100 and 120 % 20.03 22.75 20.35 23.00 20.36 22.17
Median family income and splines
Median family income 1.11 27.28 1.13 27.27 1.09 26.05
Income spline at $20,000 20.45 210.93 20.47 211.34 20.42 29.95
Income spline at $40,000 20.28 218.87 20.30 219.67 20.29 218.93
Income spline at $60,000 20.27 213.79 20.26 213.21 20.27 214.05
Income spline at $80,000 20.05 21.26 20.04 21.26 20.04 21.20
Income spline at $100,000 0.04 0.88 0.04 0.90 0.04 0.88
Dummy variables for change in median family income, 1980–1990
Base group: less than 0.00
Change in income between
0.00 and 0.25 21.93 29.02 21.85 28.69 21.98 29.27
Change in income between
0.25 and 0.50 23.65 216.51 23.57 216.15 23.70 216.78
Change in income more than
0.50 25.62 222.84 25.57 222.62 25.66 223.02
Change in population,
1980–1990 0.10 3.82 0.10 3.86 0.10 3.82
Dummy variables for population, 1990
Base group: less than 1,000
Population between 1,000
and 10,000 0.95 1.67 0.87 1.51 0.97 1.71
Population between 25,000
and 50,000 1.84 3.26 1.75 3.10 0.19 3.30
Population more than 50,000 1.98 2.72 1.82 2.49 0.20 2.78
House usage variables, 1990
Share of structures 1 unit
attached 20.10 225.33 20.10 225.43 20.10 225.14
Share of structures 2 units 20.57 296.27 20.58 296.55 20.57 295.82
Share of structures 3–4 units 20.67 2103.77 20.67 2103.36 20.67 2103.61
Share of structures 5 or
more units 20.66 2238.26 20.66 2237.91 20.66 2238.32
Share of structures mobile homes 0.15 31.67 0.14 30.91 0.15 31.95
Average household size 0.03 18.77 0.03 19.65 0.03 18.43
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TABLE A3—Continued
Model I Model II Model III
overall minority share relative income
Para- Para- Para-
meter t- meter t- meter t-
estimate Statistic estimate Statistic estimate Statistic
Age of household head, 1990
Share of household heads
aged 15–24 21.06 25.15 21.09 25.27 21.07 25.18
Share of household heads
aged 25–34 20.60 22.90 20.61 22.96 20.61 22.94
Share of household heads
aged 35–44 20.72 23.49 20.75 23.64 20.73 23.52
Share of household heads
aged 45–54 20.66 23.19 20.68 23.29 20.67 23.22
Share of household heads
aged 55–64 20.72 23.46 20.74 23.57 20.72 23.48
Share of household heads
aged 65–74 20.45 22.18 20.47 22.29 20.46 22.21
Share of household heads aged
75 or more 20.47 22.30 20.50 22.41 20.48 22.32
Central city (dummy variable) 0.07 1.01 0.10 1.36 0.06 0.82
Lender market characteristics
Herfindhal index 23.34 211.46 23.34 211.46 23.36 211.49
Mortgage bankers-to-depository
institutions ratio 20.20 20.72 20.24 20.91 20.18 20.63
Memo items:
R2 0.92 0.92 0.92
Dependent variable mean 0.62 0.62 0.62
Note. All of the variables except intercept, house usage, and age of household head variables are
multiplied by 100.
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TABLE A4
MSA Level Estimation for All Households Controlling for Census
Tract Characteristics
StepII. OWNm 5 g0 1 g1 FHAm 1 g2 INCOMEm 1 g3 DEMOGRAPHICm 1
g4 LENDERm 1 «m.
Model I Model II Model III
overall minority share relative income
Parameter t- Parameter t- Parameter t-
estimate Statistic estimate Statistic estimate Statistic
Intercept 0.35 2.76 0.36 2.83 0.17 2.83
FHA activity 3.43 2.53 9.27 4.10 7.65 2.20






Less than 80% 26.52 21.55
Between 80 and 100% 24.65 21.25
Between 100 and 120% 22.56 20.69
Economic characteristics
Median family income,
1990 20.18 21.41 20.17 21.34
Growth in median family
income, 1980–1990 2.91 1.77 1.45 0.90 2.55 1.64
Share of households with
income less than
$50,000 3.32 0.33 3.91 0.12 3.39 2.90
Dummy variables for relative income
Base group: greater
than 120%
Less than 80% 24.20 22.54 23.69 22.18 21.72 20.90
Between 80 and 100% 23.40 22.75 23.03 22.37 22.07 21.51
Between 100 and 120% 21.04 21.20 20.85 20.95 20.55 20.55
Unemployment rate 20.11 20.75 20.05 20.38 20.10 20.74
Demographic characteristics
Growth in population,
1980–1990 3.32 2.07 3.91 2.50 3.39 2.13
Change in minority
Share, 1980–1990 11.74 1.53 14.72 1.86
Percentage of young
population (age less
than 35) 242.01 28.63 9.27 28.11 7.65 28.58
Average household size 21.91 21.42 22.37 21.72 21.29 20.95
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TABLE A4—Continued
Model I Model II Model III
overall minority share relative income
Parameter t- Parameter t- Parameter t-
estimate Statistic estimate Statistic estimate Statistic
Dummy variables for minority share
Base group: less than 10%
Minority share between
0.10 and 0.25 20.19 20.36 1.87 2.19 0.07 0.12
Minority share between
0.25 and 0.50 20.06 20.09 2.74 2.59 0.51 0.77
Minority share more than
0.50 20.04 20.05 2.66 2.49 0.48 0.50
Dummy variables for population
Base group: less than
25,000
Population, between
25,000 and 50,000 0.30 0.40 0.10 0.13 0.26 0.35
Population more than
50,000 1.53 1.72 1.19 1.35 1.61 1.82
Lender market characteristics
Herfindhal index 10.46 1.69 7.15 1.15 8.05 1.32
Mortgage bank-to-Deposit
Institutions Ratio 22.11 21.28 21.50 20.91 22.43 21.48
Dummy variables for region
Base group: Northeast
Midwest 20.35 20.59 21.05 21.76 20.51 20.85
South 27.31 211.11 27.81 211.24 27.42 211.24
West 23.14 24.76 23.46 25.33 23.31 24.94
Memo Items:
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.63 0.62
F statistic 26.01 24.87 23.79
Note. All of the variables except intercept, house usage, and age of household head variables are
multiplied by 100.
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